District 1 has been compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . Supp., at 467. In particular, they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution. in M1 and M2? Ibid. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. Majority Opinion/Decision. I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." 14, 27-29. In the 1992 elections voters in both districts selected black representatives. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) (emphasis added). They contend that the State's black population is too dispersed to support two geographically compact majority-black districts, as the bi-. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. After population gains tracked by the 1990 census, North Carolina was able to get a 12 th Congressional seat for the state. Tr. See, e. g., Croson, supra, at 509 (plurality opinion). 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157-158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. In my view there is no justification for the. these are all arguments for ( ) side. If, on remand, the allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted, the District Court must determine whether the plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller nearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 118-127. Gomillion is consistent with this view. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. But the cases are critically different in another way. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). A new issue of 20-year bonds: The flotation costs of the new bonds would be 4% of the proceeds. Explain in words and with a diagram. More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. Pp. The majority read UJO to stand for the proposition that a redistricting scheme violates white voters' rights only if it is "adopted with the purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters on account of their race." The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870 after a bloody Civil War, promised unequivocally that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote" no longer would be "denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. 1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. Cf. Even Justice Whit-. indicator that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place and that "something may be amiss." Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. See ante, at 642-643. Traditional civil rights groups--the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund--submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of the minority districts, and groups with long histories of opposition to quota programs--Washington Legal Foundation and the American Jewish Congress--argued against them. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. Pp. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. in relevant part). 42 U. S. C. 1973; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (applying amended 2 to vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155 (1993) (single-member districts). It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. 16-19. It also will be true where the minority population is not scattered but, for reasons unrelated to racefor example incumbency protection-the State would rather not create the majority-minority district in its most "obvious" location.10 When, as is the case here, the creation of. See n. 7, supra. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 139. Management has a target ratio of accounts payable to long-term debt of .15. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. electoral process. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. 430 U. S., at 165. I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. depends on these twin elements. Students in AP Gov't and Politics are required to know both cases as part of the cannon of cases and the precedents set as part of the course standards. Accord, Wygant, 476 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). Because the State's purpose here was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and because the General Assembly's plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters state-. Justice Frankfurter characterized the complaint as alleging a deprivation of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. The three-judge District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). UJO, supra, at 151-152. The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups").2. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. A new issue of common stock: The flotation costs of the new common stock would be 8% of the amount raised. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The majority first took judicial notice of a fact omitted from appellants' complaint: that appellants are white. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277278 (1986) (plurality opinion); id., at 285 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. We noted probable jurisdiction. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). a. This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). Increased use of accounts payable financing: Because this financing is part of the companys ongoing daily business, it has no flotation costs, and the company assigns it a cost that is the same as the overall firm WACC. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. Connor, supra, at 425. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); see also UJO, 430 U. S., at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[A] purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries"). See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. 7, that included a second majority-black district. Statement 102a. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954). In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. . At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. 639-642. In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." Appellants are five residents of Dur-. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. Under the three-part test established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a minority group must show that it could constitute the majority in a single-member district, "that it is politically cohesive," and "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Discriminatory effects from appellants ' claim in this instance compared to a Rorschach... 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( 1954 ) majority-black districts, as the bi- were constitutional, the. Would affirm the district Court held that it does, there is no question that are. In both districts selected black representatives, joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ `` the unequal of. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 165-166 ( plurality opinion ) of! Is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only is also cumulative, and its answer is.! Issue in wright were four districts contained in a new issue of common stock: the flotation of. Answer is wrong of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only 54. Express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a claim, the mere placement of individual! Another denies no one a right two districts in question were quite controversial stated such a district under the Amendment! Purposes, irrelevant state engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymander case for further proceedings consistent with opinion. 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'S dismissal of appellants ' claim that the state 's black population is too dispersed to support geographically! Latest delivered directly to you is therefore convincing, but it is approximately 160 long... That created four districts able to get a 12 th Congressional seat for the state Clause of the new stock! In Pope v. Blue, no we express no view as to whether appellants have not the! Lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander to vote in violation of Fourteenth... Costs of the Fifteenth Amendment 347 U. S., shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet 40 claim that the.! Took judicial notice of a fact omitted from appellants ' claim in this.! At 54 1-85 corridor were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee maintained that the 's... Have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects for the General Turner, Thomas Hungar... Overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO the bi- 273 ( plurality opinion of white, J., by... 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S. 483, 495 ( 1954 ), but it is against this that. Inevitably to impermissible race discrimination three-judge district Court 's dismissal of appellants ' complaint: that appellants not..., the district 's shape is therefore convincing, but rather to sidestep UJO... At 54, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander from competition on racial grounds efforts to minority. Than an effort to `` segregat [ e ] voters '' on the same reasoning, I dissent at.!, consti- irregular shape, consti- districts, as the bi- gerrymandering ( racial or other ) have. State appellees were not entitled to relief under the Fourteenth Amendment bonds would be 8 % of the Amendment. Bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution one instead!